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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
PUiintiff-Respondent,

vs.

EDWARD ONISKOR,

Case No.

12696

Def endant-Appel/,ant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the defendant, Edward Oniskor,
from hi" conviction of the crimes of murder in the first
degree, rape and robbery.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree, rape and robhcry in the Second .Judicial Di.strict
Court, in and for the County of Weber, State of Utah.
Defendant was thereafter sentenced to a term of life imprisonment at the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the conviction of defendant for each offense found by the lower court should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Complaints were signed charging the defendant with
committing robbery from a person on or about the first
day of ,January, 1971, and did at the same time and place
conm1it the crime of murder in the first degree and further,
at the same time and place the cnme
of rape.
All evidence indicated that in the early morning
hours of New Year's Day, 1971, Mrs. Lucille R. Pierron,
who lived alone in an apartment located on 25th Street
in Ogden, Utah, was assaulted, robbed, raped and murdered by the defendant. Defendant was apprehended by
the Ogden City Police after he was observed to be in the
JX>Ssession of a ring and certain keys belonging to the decea"ed Pierron (T. 905). After questioning he confessed
to the killing and the robbery (T. 907).
A verdict of guilty on all three charges was returned
by the jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO ERROR WHEN THE
TRIAL COURT JUDGE ALLOWED RECORDED PRELIMINARY HEARING TES-

TIMONY OF TWO ABSENT WITNESSES
TO EE READ INTO EVIDENCE AT THE
TRIAL.
The court commitred no error when it allowed the
stare to read into evidence, at the trial, testimony given
by absent witnesses, who had given sworn testimony at
the preliminary hearing.
The reading into evidence during a trial of the recorded restimony of sworn witnesses at a preliminary
hearing is not new. However, there are certain admissibility standards set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8 (4)
( 1953) which govern such testimony. The stat.e complied
with these statutory requirements when defendant was
tried and convicted of rape, robbery and murder in the
first degree. Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8(4) (1953) provides:
"In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is
entitled: ... (4) to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, except that, where the charge has
been preliminarily examined before a committing
magistrat.e and the t.estimony taken down by
question and answer in the presence of the defendant, who has, either in person or by counsel,
cross-examined or has had an opportunity to crossexamine the witness, . . . the deposition of such
witness may be read, upon it being satisfactorily
shown to the court that he ... cannot with due
diligence be found within the stat.e."
Appellant claims that the stare failed t.o make a diligent effort to produce certain witnesses at the trial The
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State did make a diligent effort and rud in fact inform
tht> court and the defendant that both witnesses were out
of the state\ jurisdiction (T. 268).
In Stale \. !JcPretto, ___
Utah __ , 11[) P. :336
(
the Supreme Court of Utah explained "due diligence"' in holding that where there has been a preliminary
cx;u11ination and testimony of a witness has been taken
down by question and answer, in the presence of the def<·ndant, who had an opportunity to cross-exan1ine, the
deposition of such witness may be read upon a satisfactory showing that he (the absent \vitness) cannot without dw• diligence (by the state) be found within the
state.
The defendant questions the meaning of "due diligence" and argues that the state is required to follow
St.•ction 77-45-1:3, U. C. A. 1953, and bring material witncs'.;cs within the jurisdiction at his request. Such an
interpretation of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from ·without the State in a Criminal Ca:>e (Section 77-4,C)-13, U. C. A. 1953) is not correct.
This statute was enacted to help the various states participating, forty one at last count, to better prosecute
criminal cases. It was not enacted to force the states to
make any special effmt to secure the attendance of absent
witnesses, but rather provides the states with a means
of securing out-of-state witnesses. The discretion t:o do
such is with the state.
The Court further stated in DePretto, supra, that
" ... the state, showing that the witness was not within
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the state, hut was in another state at the time and for
'
some time preceding the trial, was not required to further
prove that a special effort was made to find the witness
within the stat<" and might read his testimony in evidence at the trial." The court in DePretto, supra, clearly
states that due diligence by the state was not some special
effort to produce the witness, but was rather a showing
that the witness was in fact in another jurisdiction.
The state made a showing (T. 268-276) that both
Mr. Charles Evans and Dr. Irvine Moncrief were in fact
out of the state's jurisdiction and, under the DePretto
rule, the state's showing such constituted due diligence
and no Rhowing of a special effort by the state to produre
the witnesses was necessary.
Concerning the reading at the trial of testimony
given at the preliminary hearing, such practice is justified
under the decision of State v. Leggroan, 15 Utah 2d 153,
389 P. 2d 142 (1964). This is a case dealing particularly
with the admissibility of preliminary hearing transcriptc; in
a murder case. The defendant was convicted in the Third
Judicial District Court of robbery and second degree murder and he appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. It was
held that the transcript of testimony of a non-resident
witness taken at a preliminary hearing was properly received in evidence even though a judicial certificate was
not
punwmt to
Uniform Act to Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses (77-45-13, U. C. A. (1953) ). It
is, therefore, submitted to the court that the statutes have
been constrned to allow the state, upon such proof that
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the individual is beyond the jurisdiction of this court and
cannot with due diligence be found within the state, to
proceed to report and give to the jury the recorded testimony as produced at the preliminary hearing.
Appellant argues that State v. Leggroan, supra,
allows the defendant means by which he may invoke Utah
Code Ann. § 77-45-13 (1953) and sets forth those means
for the defense counsel to invoke the provisions of the
Act. At the trial the district court said that defense counsel had the authorization to secure the attendance of the
two witnesses and that the state would provide the necessary funds. Also, the court offered the defendant's counsel a continuance at any time he wanted one (Tr. 313).
Defendant's counsel never made an attempt to invoke
the Act as provided for in Leggroan, supra, nor did he
ask for a continuance.
The trial court stated that it felt that the state had
made a diligent effort to produce the witnes.s and that the
state law was clear on allowing the recorded testimony
to be re.ad at the trial. Again, the Leggroan, supra, case
stated, " ... the permissive tenor of the act has led the
court, wherever the problem has arisen, almost unanimously to conclude that the Act, as to the production of
witnesses, may be helpful in a given case, permissive in
nature, but not mandatory. We think such authorities
reflect good reason and logic and we go along with them
under the facts of this particular case."
The defendant argues that because the prosecution
did not swear under oath that the two witnesses were in
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fact out of the stak ·,, jurisdiction that the court com-

mitted rc\'e,:.;iblc crru!· when it allowed their recorded
µrdiminary tcstimcny to be read at the ti;al. Concerning tlfr.; situc1tion, it is important to look at what these
ali:-;ent
testified to at the preliminary hearing.
A:.
court will recall, thcie were two witnessec; who
<bcl not testify at the tr."al but rather their recorded pre]iminary hearing testimony was read into evidence at the
trial in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8 (4)
( 1!153). Fin-t, r. . Ir. Charles Evans' recorded testimony
'':rs read to the effect that he saw the defendant on the
J['.nuary 1, 1971, in possession of a certain ring and a
watch Y:hich bdonged to the deceased. There was little
in }--11
TI1c fact that he did see the defendant in possession of the ring and the watch was not denied by defendant at trial but was rather substantiated
when he said "I wanted to try to sell the watch and ring
to the Elko County Jailers," (Tr. 890), who was identif iPd as Mr. Evans, the absent witness. Also, a May Harris saw the defendant with the ring and watch in Elko
and the arresting officer found these and other items on
his person when the defendant was arrested in Ogden
(Tr. 294). Therefore, the state submits that since the
defendant admitted taking the ring and the watch from
the deceased (Tr. 883) and since he never denied having
lost possession of the ring and the watch between the
time of the taking and his subsequent arrest, the testimony of Mr. Evans was not critical and certainly in light
of the other testimony substantiated by the defendant
himself, the introduction into evidence of the recorded
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preliminary testimony of Mr. Evans was not prejudicial
error.
1l1C state submits along a similar theory that the recorded testimony of Dr. l\1oncrief which was read at trial
in his absence and in accordance with Section 77-1-8 ( 4)
should either be allowed to stand or looked upon as nonprejudicial error. Dr. Moncrief testified to the fact that
the condition of the body was such that he believed in
his expert opinion the deceased was manually suffocated.
It is called to the court's attention that the state medical
examiner, Dr. Weston, also testified at the trial that the
cause of death was manual suffocation (Tr. 318-19).
Defendant said that he saw the deceased alive on the
night in question. He stated that after he placed a pillow
over her face and sat upon it until she stopped kicking
that he felt she had died (Tr. 881). Certainly this statement from the defendant and the testimony at trial of
Dr. Weston as to the cause of death provided the jury
with sufficient evidence to conclude that this act of defendant did in fact cause the decedent's death. Dr. Moncrief's testimony was substantiated by both Dr. Weston
and the defendant. Therefore, the state submits that the
recorded testimony read into trial was not prejudicial and
the state should affirm the conviction for robbery and
murder in the first degree.
The appellant cites, Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719
(1968), as pointing out that a criminal defendant should
be allowed to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
and that any hearsay evidence presented should be carefully controlled.
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Hearsay evidence i!' not, per se, inadmissible but is
to be carcl'ully CC'ntrolled. In ihc state such controls come
through Section 77-1-8 ( 4), U. C. A. 1953, supra.
The
Court of the Unit<->d
has made it
quilc dear as to what confrontation I•wru1,.;. In Pointer
v. TPxas, :380 U. S. 400, 405 (19G5), it was held that:
•·'i !1UP are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this court
and other court<> have been more nearly unanimous than
in their cxp;·essing of belief that the right to confrontation ancl cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is their
cmmtry·!, constitutional goal." However, that court went
on to say in the next paragraph, in citing Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S.
(1895), that "there has tracUionally been an exception to the confrontation requirement when a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at a previous judicial proceeding against the same
d2fendant which was subject to cross-examination by the
defendant." This exception has been explained as arising
from necessity and had been justified on the grounds that
the right of cross-examination initially afforded provides
substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence §§
1:195-1396, 1402 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCormic, Evidence
231, 234 (1954).
Section 77-1-8 ( 4), U. C. A. 1953, is in compliance
with Green v. California, 399 U. S. 149 (1970). In that
case a witness testified at a preliminary hearing and his
testimony was subject to cross-examination. The stat.e
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introduced the testimony at trial to impeach the same
witness. The California Supreme Court held that this
was improper. The United States Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that the practice of reading
into evidence testimony recorded at a preliminary hearing
was pe1missible and did not deprive the defendant of his
right to confrontation.
Since Utah's statute, Section 77-1-8 ( 4) is substantially the same as the one in California and since the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled in Green that
such statutes are constitutional, the state then submits
that there was no denial of confrontation to the defendant
in this case.
POINT II.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ALLOWING
THE STATE PATHOLOGIST TO RENDER
AN OPINION AS TO THE CAUSE OF
DEATH WHEN SAID OPINION WAS NOT
BASED ON A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.
Petitioner states than an expert witness' premises are
always subject to cross-examination. This the respondent
does not deny, but, when defendant contends that the
only way an expert may be examined is through the hypothetical question method, the respondent must disagree. Appellant claims on page fourteen of his brief that
since there were repeated objections to the state's failure
to frame a proper hypothetical question that would limit
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and specify the basis for Dr. Weston's opinion, and since
such objections were overruled, that the court erred.
This argument has no merit. Mandatory questioning
in the hypothetical form of an expert only applies when
the expert has made no investigation of the facts for himself.
If an expert witness has first hand knowledge of matNial facts, he may describe what he has seen and give
his expert inferences therefrom. In this situation it is not
nPcessary to couch questions eliciting the inference in
hypothetical form. See Sherman v. City of Springfi.eld,
77 Ill. App. 2d 195, 222 N. E. 2d 62 (1967) and for the
fonn of such question see 82 A. L. R. 1338.

When a hypothetical question is asked of an expert
who has made no examination of his own, such expert
is to assume that the facts of the question are true and
then give an academic opinion. This form of questioning
need not apply to defendant's case. Dr. West:on did make
an investigation and from his findings as a result of the
investigation and from information received from Ogden
police officials he was able to render an expert opinion
as to the cause of death.
There is nothing unusual about this procedure inasmuch as it should be assumed that an expert in a science
is competent to judge the reliability of statements made
to him by other investigat:ors. He is as competent to do
this as a judge and a jury are to pass upon the credibility
of an ordinary witness on the stand. If the statements,
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then, are attested to by the expert as the basis for a judgment upon which he would act in the practice of his profession, it seems that the statements above would constitute a sufficient basis for his direct expression of professional opinion on the stand. This argument is reinforced when the opinion is founded not only upon reports
but also in part upon the expert's firsthand observation.
The observation of the expert will usually enable him to
evaluate the reliability of the statements.
Dr. Weston, the pathologist, whose testimony is in
question, testified that the cause of death was due to
suffocation. His statement was based upon his own investigation and upon reports made by the Ogden City
Police Department.
CONCLUSION
Both arguments made by appellant are unfounded.
Appellant was granted every aspect of due process and
the procedure followed was proper. Therefore, respondent submits that the conviction of Edward Oniskor of
rape, robbery and murder in the first degree should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
KENT S. LEWIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

